David Downs v. Borough of Jenkintown by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-16-2021 
David Downs v. Borough of Jenkintown 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"David Downs v. Borough of Jenkintown" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 524. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/524 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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BOROUGH OF JENKINTOWN; 
SEAN P. KILKENNY;  
DEBORA PANCOE;  




Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2:18-cv-04529) 
District Judge: Hon. Jan E. DuBois  
      
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 13, 2021 
 
Before: McKEE, JORDAN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKee, Circuit Judge. 
 David and Margaret Downs appeal the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Borough of Jenkintown, and certain of its employees and 
councilmembers.  The Court found that defendants Debora Pancoe and Richard Bunker 
were not personally involved in the alleged retaliation, that George Locke was entitled to 
qualified immunity, and that there was no basis for municipal liability on the Downses’ 
claims of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
I. 
Qualified immunity “shields public officials performing discretionary functions 
from § 1983 . . . liability ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”1  The 
doctrine therefore turns on whether a “clearly established” constitutional right was 
violated, and whether a “reasonable [official] would have believed that his or her conduct 
deprived the plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights.”2  We have previously held that 
reliance on advice of counsel creates a presumption of qualified immunity.3   
The Downses argue that this qualified immunity defense should fail, as the 
“unpublished and unknown ruling articulated by [the Magisterial District] Judge” 
 
1 Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Abbott 
v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
2 Id. (citing Abbott, 164 F.3d at 148). 
3 See Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that “a 
police officer who [reasonably] relies in good faith on a prosecutor's legal opinion. . . is 
presumptively entitled to qualified immunity from Fourth Amendment claims premised 
on a lack of probable cause.”). 
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constitutes disputed issues of fact.4  It is uncontested that the Magisterial District Judge 
made an oral ruling expanding the definition of an impact business, in the presence of the 
Borough Solicitor.  Locke consulted the Borough Solicitor when deciding whether to 
issue a Notice of Violation to the Downses.  The Solicitor advised Locke that he had a 
“reasonable basis” based on the Judge’s ruling.5  Nothing in the record refutes that 
testimony and we therefore agree that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the 
Judge’s ruling.6  
The District Court also correctly determined that Borough councilmembers 
Debora Pancoe and Richard Bunker did not actively participate in, or direct, any 
retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7  While the councilmembers were potentially 
aware of the notices that the claim of retaliation is based on, the issuing and subsequent 
 
4 Appellants’ Br. at 37, 40–41. 
5 Id. at 357a-58a (p. 49:23-50:7).  
6 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986); Lauren W. ex rel. 
Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n considering a motion for 
summary judgment the court should believe uncontradicted testimony unless it is 
inherently implausible . . . .”).  Even if we interpreted the Downses’ denial that there was 
a pertinent ruling from the Magisterial District Judge as sufficient to create a genuine 
issue of fact, we would affirm the District Court’s grant of qualified immunity on the 
alternative ground that Locke did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.  
See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012) (explaining that “the right allegedly 
violated must be established not as a broad general proposition, but in a particularized 
sense so that the contours of the right are clear to a reasonable official[.]” (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)); Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 
2017) (applying Reichle and defining the right as “the right to be free from a retaliatory 
restriction on communication with one’s government, when the plaintiff has threatened or 
engaged in litigation against the government.”). 
7 See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In order to 
state a [§ 1983] claim, plaintiff must show that defendants, acting under color of state 
law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution . . . .”). 
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reissuing of the Notice of Violation were clearly within Locke’s sole discretion.  He 
testified without contradiction to his independent authority to issue the notices.8  
Seeking to establish municipal liability, the Downses further contend that Pancoe, 
Bunker, and Locke were policymakers acting on behalf of the Borough to enforce an 
illegal practice or custom.  However, as discussed earlier, the record would not support a 
conclusion that Pancoe or Bunker violated any constitutional right.  Thus, although they 
may be policymakers for purposes of § 1983, municipal liability cannot be predicated on 
their actions.9  Moreover, we explained in Brennan v. Norton why someone in Locke’s 
position cannot be a policymaker for purposes of municipal liability.10  Thus, the District 
Court correctly determined that the Borough was immune from liability. 
Although the Downses contend that the Borough had a custom of selectively 
enforcing its zoning code, the record does not support that assertion. “[T]he mere 
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise 
 
8 See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (highlighting 
that personal involvement must be demonstrated by outlining “participation in or actual 
knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988))). 
9 See Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 467 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[The 
municipality] cannot be vicariously liable under Monell unless one of [its] employees is 
primarily liable under section 1983 itself.”). 
10 350 F.3d 399, 428 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasizing that “if a municipal employee’s 
decision is subject to review, even discretionary review, it is not final and that employee 
is therefore not a policymaker for purposes of imposing municipal liability under § 
1983.” (citation omitted)). 
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properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no 
genuine issue of material fact.”11 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to all defendants. 
 
11 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–248 (emphasis in original); see also St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 
485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (recognizing that a widespread practice, even if not authorized 
by law or express policy, may be utilized to find municipal liability under § 1983 so long 
as the practice is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom . . .’ with the 
force of law.” (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970))). 
